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Peter H. Koehn

When we probe beneath the surface of climatic-change issues, we ªnd that the
people of China and the United States share much in common. The decisions
and activities of both sets of policy makers and populations account for an inordinate share of the current and projected greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions that
threaten the quality of inhabitants’ lives and those of all people’s descendents—
particularly those who are least responsible for global warming.1 There is an urgent need for mitigating actions across the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and the USA. Both national governments, however, continue to reject mandatory emission targets.
The primary subject of interest in this article is another, incipient and relatively unexplored, China-US convergence; that is, the emergence of emissionmitigating initiatives and prospects at the subnational government level. For instance, plans are underway for a new city of half a million people in Dongtan,
an island in the Yangtze River across from Shanghai, that is intended to generate
a zero contribution to global warming.2 In the United States, Salt Lake City,
Utah, exceeded the emissions-reduction target of the Kyoto Protocol in its municipal-government operations “seven years early” (i.e., in 2005). “We believe
that leadership begins at home, especially when it has been abdicated at higher
1. See Koehn 2007, 1085–1087; and Roberts and Parks 2006, 7–11, 37. Although the United States
and the People’s Republic of China both play major and growing roles in anthropogenic climatic change, differences in the extent of their respective responsibility are apparent when viewed
in historical and per capita perspective. Speciªcally, China’s emissions of carbon dioxide are of
recent derivation and below average on a per capita basis, while US per capita GHG outputs
have been and continue to be far above average. Gardiner 2004, 584; and Graham-Harrison
and Wynn 2007. Roberts and Parks (2006, A8) calculate that, even today, “the average U.S. citizen dumps as much greenhouse gas into the atmosphere as nine Chinese citizens. . .”
2. Minneapolis Star Tribune, 15 May 2006. In the plan for Dongtan, “all manner of waste—sewage
included—becomes fodder for biomass-derived electricity.”
Global Environmental Politics 8:1, February 2008
© 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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levels of government,” asserted Salt Lake City Mayor Rocky Anderson on behalf
of some 250 US mayors committed to major GHG emission reductions.3
In the analysis of subnational policy initiatives and prospects in China
and the United States, two concepts are particularly helpful. Multilevel governance allows us to situate the role of subnational governments within the dynamic multi-institutional decision-inºuencing context of global environmental
politics. In addition, the diffuse and often imperceptible nature of climatic
change necessitates an approach to emission-reduction efforts and prospects
through a public-interest framing lens. Framing through local issue bundling, or
tying together the co-beneªts of previously distinct public concerns, enables
municipal, state, and provincial government leaders to develop innovative and
effective mitigation policies.4 The concluding comparison assesses subnational
policy developments along with framing opportunities in the Peoples’ Republic
of China and the United States of America.

Global Climatic Change: US and Mainland Contributions
The USA and the PRC are the ªrst and second largest annual contributors of
CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion. Although the United States only
supports 5 percent of the world’s population, its high per capita emission rate
results in the generation of roughly 25 percent of total annual anthropogenic
greenhouse gases. At their current rate of increase, moreover, US GHG emissions
will be approximately 25 percent higher in 2012 than they were in 1990.
China’s contributions to global warming are rooted in industrial production, population dynamics, and “offshoring” of raw-materials exploitation. In
recent years, Mainland industrial production has frequently increased by nearly
20 percent per annum.5 Reºecting on China’s export-driven economy, a member of the Green River Chinese environmental NGO lamented that “highconsumption, high-pollution industries declining in other parts of the world
ºock here to churn out vast quantities of junk products . . .”6 destined for Northern consumers. China’s population now exceeds 1,300,000,000 people. Rising
incomes and pent-up consumer demand render China’s enormous population
explosive in terms of GHG emissions. China’s GHG-emissions take-off is generated, in part, by an unparalleled nation-wide construction boom of housing,
ofªce space, and roads. To satisfy its construction needs, the Mainland now produces more steel than Japan and the USA combined and “cement consumption
is over 640 million tons per annum, a level six times higher than U.S. consumption.”7
3. Anderson 2006, A8. By May 2007, the US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement had 500 signers. Kugler 2007, A7.
4. See Steinberg 2001, 203.
5. Hale 2004, 137.
6. Tan 2006, 34.
7. Hale 2004, 139.
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The combination of rapid urbanization, unleashed consumer demands,
and robust manufacturing of exported products has catapulted China into
the world’s top position as an importer of industrial raw materials.8 The interaction of population and household growth, dramatic increases in per capita
income and consumption, and continued expansion in domestic manufacturing accounts for the PRC’s USA-surpassing trajectory as the world’s top gross
GHG emitter.9 As China turns overseas to quench its voracious thirst for nonrenewable resources, additional Mainland-associated GHG emissions are being
generated by intensive offshore extraction and long-distance transportation processes.

Kyoto and Beyond: Multilevel Governance10
Climatic-stabilization efforts are enhanced when multiple actors and institutions at all levels of governance pursue complementary GHG-mitigation
activities. Looking ahead to the post-2012 climate regime, supranational and
multinational institutions, nation-states, subnational authorities, NGOs, transnational social movements, and citizen advocates all are important players in
the politics of consumption, emissions reduction/limitation, and adaptation.
National Government Roles and Framing in China and the USA
In spite of the growing body of convincing evidence that atmospheric warming
poses a serious threat to ecological sustainability and the well-being of their citizens, the national governments of China and the United States have steadfastly
resisted pressures to adopt mandatory measures that would bring their worldleading GHG emissions under control. Based on comparative per capita emission and consumption ªgures, one can conclude that the US Government refuses to address reduction obligations while the Government of the PRC disregards limitation obligations.
As a non-Annex I (developing) country, China is not obliged under the
Kyoto Protocol to adopt mandatory GHG-emission targets and the central government has shown no inclination to undertake concrete binding emissions
commitments. The position on climatic-change policy articulated by PRC
ofªcials involves a mix of perceived national self-interest and commitment to
the worldview shared by many countries in the global South. Party leaders continue to frame national stability as dependent upon industrial expansion and
growth in GDP, lately coupled with high-level support for mitigating gross dis-

8. Hale 2004.
9. Several analysts have estimated that China’s CO2 emissions surpassed US totals in 2007. Graham-Harrison and Wynn 2007.
10. For a discussion of the concept of multilevel governance as it is used here, see Bulkeley and
Betsill 2003, 27–29.
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parities in wealth.11 In addition, the central government opposes setting concrete emission targets in the absence of prior commitment on the part of countries historically responsible for current levels of greenhouse gases (most
notably, the United States) to curtail conspicuous consumption.12 By advocating the principles of historical responsibility, compensatory justice, and equal
per capita atmospheric carbon-absorption entitlements, and by insisting that
promoting economic development and global equity be included when negotiating international agreements that affect climatic stabilization,13 Mainland
leaders are able to justify continued pursuit of their chosen growth-dependent
path without incurring pressures for immediate emission-mitigation actions
from poor countries that value China’s leadership in advancing the South’s
agenda.14
While a growing number of China’s political leaders have publicly recognized environmental protection, green development, and restrained resource
consumption as additional core national policies, this discourse has had a negligible effect on the Mainland’s emission trajectory.15 The central government
has issued multiple laws and regulations dealing with air pollution and control,
energy savings, and solid-waste prevention.16 Recently, the national leadership
of the PRC emphasized clean-technology measures in the 11th Five-Year Plan, introduced a renewable-energy target of 10 percent by 2020, and promised to treat
reductions in energy usage and pollutants as “red lines that can’t be crossed.”17
However, the national government’s capacity to inºuence emission practices has
diminished “as polluting state-owned enterprises are privatized and the political-economic decisions of China’s central leadership lose their command-andcontrol certainty.”18 While “the state continues to devolve authority over environmental issues away from the center, delegating enforcement of both central
and local government laws and regulations to local ofªcials,”19 central govern11. Bradsher 2006, C1; and Economy 2004, 185.
12. PRC, Central People’s Government, 2007. Roberts and Parks note (2006, 225, 140–141) that
“lack of progress (and backsliding) by the United States in meeting its own target for carbon dioxide emissions by the end of the decade has provided developing nations with a ready excuse
for not making reductions.”
13. Roberts and Parks 2006, 23, 26, 38, 45, 139, 144–145, 180, 184, 231; and Ma Kai 2007.
14. See Koehn 2004, 382–383.
15. With the exception of state policy regarding carbon sequestration. In 2006, China’s State Forestry Administration agreed to follow the Climate, Community, & Biodiversity Alliance’s “CCB
Standards” in the design of new forestry projects in Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. See
www.climate-standards.org. To satisfy the country’s voracious appetite for wood, however,
China has offshored deforestation to Brazil, parts of Africa, and Indonesia. Friedman 2005b;
and Perlez 2006.
16. See “Environmental Legislation” at www.chinacp.com/eng/cppub/print/cnenvleg.html; and
PRC, State Council 2006.
17. The quotation is attributed to Zhou Shengxian, head of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). China Environment News 2006. Also see Friedman 2006; and
Niederberger, Brunner, and Dadi 2006, 85.
18. Willmott 2006, 16.
19. Economy 2005, 103, 106.
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ment incentives and political cover remain important for local government
ofªcials who are inclined to be innovative with regard to emission mitigation.
The George W. Bush Administration has consistently rejected the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In
late 2006, the Bush Administration continued to insist that it had no plans to
accept binding emissions reductions.20 Instead of the emissions-reduction targets favored by a bipartisan majority of US citizens,21 the Bush Administration
has called for voluntary efªciency enhancements,22 technology ªxes,23 carbon
sequestration,24 methane capture,25 stricter fuel-efªciency standards, and increased production of ethanol-blended fuels.26 In framing executive-branch opposition to the mandatory compliance targets of the Kyoto Protocol, President
Bush contended that “for America, complying with those [Kyoto] mandates
would have a negative economic impact.”27
Until recently, the US Congress also has been solidly against embracing
the Kyoto Protocol.28 In the wake of the Democratic Party’s capture of a majority
of seats in the Senate following the November 2006 elections, Senator Barbara
Boxer, the new chair of the Environment and Public Works Committee, indicated that she would place priority on legislation aimed at cutting GHG emissions. As long as President Bush’s economy-damaging framing prevails in Washington, D.C., however, the outlook for US national government acceptance of
mandatory GHG-emissions reductions and new targets that would commence
in 2012 is not bright.29
Subnational Initiatives
In the face of the deep-rooted resistance to fundamental modiªcations in the
expansionist economic policy that prevails in Beijing and Washington, climaticstabilization advocates who seek to reorient emissions-impacting decisions and
20. Gettleman 2006.
21. Speciªcally, a large majority favors US participation in the Kyoto Protocol (Kull 2005, 3–5) and
higher automotive fuel-efªciency standards even if the latter increase the price of a car (University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes 2004 polls cited in PA Times, February 2005, 2). National ªndings based on a New York Times/CBS News 2007 poll indicate that
large bipartisan majorities favor immediate steps to reduce the effects of global warming
(Broder and Connelly 2007).
22. Roberts and Parks 2006, 138–139, 144; and Rabe 2004, 14–15.
23. Newell 2000, 50–51; and Barringer 2006b, A27.
24. Nadler 2004, 16.
25. Janofsky 2004, A5.
26. Andrews and Barringer 2007.
27. Bush 2001, 546–547; and Roberts and Parks 2006, 142. This claim is undermined by estimates
that, at the end of 2006, the actual costs of the war in Iraq alone will exceed high-end estimates
of costs to the United States of full compliance with the Kyoto Protocol over many decades. See
Sunstein 2006.
28. See Roberts and Parks 2006, 3, 140.
29. Glenn 2006, A17.

58

•

Underneath Kyoto

population behaviors must rely on efforts that do not require national government leadership. Lack of national leadership shifts the focus of attention from
failed attempts to reach international agreements to bottom-up change initiatives. This article identiªes subnational policy and framing initiatives that possess potential for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions when national governments are unwilling to enter into and enforce binding international agreements.
Subnational efforts also could be built into any future agreements on climatic
stabilization should political change occur at the national level in the PRC and/
or the USA.
The domestic and transnational initiatives undertaken by nonstate actors
constitute one promising alternative to national government inaction.30 In its
ªrst ofªcial act, for instance, the Clinton Foundation partnered with 22 of the
world’s most populous cities, including New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago,
on projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions.31 More than 200 US university
presidents have signed a “Climate Commitment” modeled on the US mayors’
agreement that involves emission-reduction plans and curriculum innovations.32 Among other US NGOs that have identiªed climatic stabilization as a
priority issue are the National Religious Partnership for the Environment and
the recently formed Evangelical Climate Initiative.33 Transnationally networked
epistemic communities are leading nonstate actors in climatic-change politics,
although climatologists have been “resolutely unable” to change the policy position of the US national government toward the Kyoto Protocol.34
The focus of attention in this article is on subnational government institutions. Stalemate at the national level “produces the possibility for new forms of
power and politics at the subnational level.”35 In a number of policy and administrative-reform realms, local governments in both the PRC and the USA
have been at the forefront of innovation and experimentation.36 Will subnational governments lead the way in limiting and mitigating post-2012 GHG
emissions in China and the United States? Although underappreciated in scholarly circles,37 local political champions and municipal and state/provincial governments have been active in developing and sustaining creative framings that
function to control GHG emissions “underneath” the nation-state orientation
of the ofªcial Kyoto Protocol.38
30. For a detailed analysis of the emission-mitigating role of nonstate actors in China and the
United States, see Koehn 2006.
31. Steinhauer 2006, A16.
32. Cohen 2007; and Vance 2007, A25.
33. Woodard 2006, 22. For an inventory of environmental NGOs active in China, see Turner
(2002). On the spread of local NGOs generally in China, see Yu, et al. 2005, 92.
34. Newell 2000, 60–61.
35. Sassen 2004, 203.
36. See, for instance, Foster 2005, 10.
37. Vasi (2005, 67) notes that “very few scholars have analyzed local actions against global climate
change . . .” The principal exceptions are Betsill and Bulkeley and, with regard to US state government actions, the work of Rabe.
38. Bulkeley and Betsill (2003, 27) point out that the Framework Convention on Climate Change
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Emerging Subnational Policy Initiatives
Subnational governments offer particularly promising venues for GHGemissions mitigation. Annual GHG emissions in the state of Texas exceed those
generated separately by the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy.39 Recognition that cities cover less than 1 percent of Earth’s surface, but generate 80
percent of total anthropogenic GHG emissions, underlies London Mayor Ken
Livingstone’s warning that “it is in cities that the battle to tackle climate change
will be won or lost.”40 Subnational government ofªcials possess authority to
shape key processes and implementation measures affecting emissions (including energy standards for buildings, modes of transportation, tailpipe emissions,
electricity generation, renewable-energy purchases, and recycling).41 They also
have experience in addressing local environmental-protection issues and the capacity to mobilize powerful stakeholders. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the
worldwide Cities for Climate Protection program established by one of the largest transnational networks of subnational government bodies, the International
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), had nearly 600 members
(including 83 US cities) in 2002, “representing over 8 percent of total global
greenhouse gas emissions.”42 Each member has agreed to set a GHG-emissionsreduction target, formulate an action plan that will meet its goal, and implement and evaluate policies designed to attain the desired results.43
China
As a result of decentralization trends, fueled primarily by the shift from central
planning to subnational economic decision making and by an explosion of domestic and transnational ties and partnerships with external actors, China’s
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous zones have acquired their own
spheres of authority and independent means to exercise power.44 For more than
a decade, local governments have possessed primary responsibility for the enforcement of environmental-protection regulations. A wide range of environmental-policy measures, including authority to levy taxes on coal burning, to
subsidize cleaner energy sources, and to issue local regulations that supplement
national laws and administrative regulations, are at their disposal.45 One key

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

fails to mention “the role of local government or even of local action.” In contrast, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development emphasizes broad participation at the lowest policy levels. Rabe 2004, 16.
Rabe 2004, 4–5.
Kugler 2007.
Bulkeley and Betsill 2003, 2, 4, 49; and Rabe 2004, 4, 17.
Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, 477; and Vasi 2005, 67.
Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, 478; and Vasi 2005, 7–8. By 2000, 23 US local governments had developed local action plans. Bulkeley and Betsill 2003, 52.
See Orban, Chan, and Koehn 2003; Porter, Han, and Shidong 2003, 6; and Yu, et al. 2005,
33.
See, for instance, Porter, Han, and Shidong 2003, 21; and Ferris and Zhang 2005, 74–75.
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unit of governance at the subnational level is the environmental protection bureau. Ofªcials employed by local environmental protection bureaus hold primary responsibility for environmental-impact assessments, monitoring factory
emissions, assessing “polluter-pays” fees, and initiating legal action against entities that fail to comply with pollution standards.46
As a result of shifts in functional responsibility from the central to local
levels, the direct impact of municipal government policies on the lives of urban
residents has increased. This development enables subnational authorities to
assume a vital framing role regarding environmental issues. Local environmental-protection bureaus “maintain critical links with the general populace
through Web sites, hotlines, and educational programs”47 that enhance their
framing power. Until recently, however, the issue-bundling potential of China’s
newly empowered local governments has been largely ignored by multilateral
organizations.48
The decentralized nature of China’s administrative system encourages
variability in subnational environmental-protection efforts. One observer suggests that “when the mayor is environmentally proactive, income levels are
high, and the city is tightly integrated into the international community, local
environmental protection has evidenced substantial progress over the past decade.”49 Increasingly, the INGO community has been supporting local government environmental initiatives in the Mainland. One example is the concerted
effort to help the Beijing Municipal Government realize the goal of “blue skies”
over Beijing in time for the 2008 Olympics.50 Over the past decade, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has helped Chengdu and Chongqing city
governments develop clean building codes and the Energy Foundation has supported a number of energy-efªciency projects.51 In addition, the United Nations
Development Programme’s Capacity Development for China Green Lights project has trained local-level ofªcials in ways to plan and implement incentive
schemes that promote energy-efªcient lighting. Other UNDP projects developed a widely disseminated city and provincial “health-risk index” and trained
municipal ofªcials on how to subsidize research and development of cleanenergy technology.52
Some of China’s local governments have not strictly enforced environmental regulations because they view such actions as antithetical to the goal of
economic development and because of ªnancial ties to offending local enterprises. Moreover, local economic growth ªgures prominently in the perfor46.
47.
48.
49.

Economy 2005, 103; also see 107–108, 117.
Economy 2005, 103.
Chen and Uitto 2003.
Economy 2004, 117–119, 128, 260; and Economy 2005, 110–111, 117. Nearly a decade ago,
Xiaoyuan Chen (1998, 11) noted that environmental-protection linkages were beginning to
emerge among Mainland and US municipalities.
50. See China Environmental Forum 2002, 178–179; and Chiu, Green, and Sibold 2003, 46.
51. Zusman and Turner 2005, 137–138; and www.efchina.org.
52. Porter, Han, and Shidong 2003, 21, 23–24, 40.
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mance evaluations of China’s appointed mayors.53 Many of the Mainland’s
township, county, city, and provincial government bodies also depend for
ªnancial resources (including pollution ªnes) on enterprises that disregard environmental regulations.54 In most places, therefore, the prevailing politicaladministrative context requires issue bundling in order for effective GHGlimitation efforts to be implemented at the subnational level.
United States
Scholars and the media have emphasized the US national government’s failure
to adopt international agreements and stringent forward-looking national policy and legislation in the face of climatic destabilization. While domestic and
international critics have focused on national government inaction, direct and
indirect state and local governments efforts to mitigate GHG emissions have
intensiªed and expanded. By 2007, more than 20 states had adopted legislation
or issued executive orders “expressly intended to reduce greenhouse gases.”55
California (a state that produced roughly two percent of the world’s annual
GHG emissions) and New Jersey have been in the forefront of these initiatives.
In June 2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued an executive
order calling for the state to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.56
Denver stands out as a city government that has explicitly integrated emissionsmitigation considerations into its core policies and organizational structure.57
In 2006, voters in Boulder, Colorado, approved a carbon tax based on kilowatt
hours that will generate revenue for a climate-action plan aimed at reducing the
city’s carbon emissions by 24 percent from current levels.58
Such subnational policy prescriptions serve to promote public awareness
that climatic change is a serious problem and that unsustainable organizational
and personal consumption exacerbates the problem. However, durable state/
local policy and population behavioral changes that limit or reduce GHG emissions remain the exception rather than the rule in the United States (and China)
because the beneªts of global climatic stabilization are not immediately discerned or appreciated by most consumers and policy makers.59 In some policymaking situations, visible emphasis on GHG-emission reductions alone would
be counterproductive. For instance, one of the strongest supporters of the Texas
effort to require utilities to provide renewable-power sources as part of their to-

53. Murray and Cook 2004, 143. In 2006, however, 30 mayors and provincial-level ofªcials agreed
to implement accountability systems that link career advancement to progress in improved energy efªciency. China Daily, 27 July 2006.
54. Porter, Han, and Shidong 2003, 17–18.
55. Rabe 2002, 7; and Barringer and Yardley 2007, A11.
56. Rabe, Roman, and Dobelis 2005, 9; and Rabe 2004, 34, 110, 133.
57. Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, 483, 488; and Bulkeley and Betsill 2003, 124–125.
58. Kelley 2006, A11.
59. Koehn 2006, 384–388.
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tal electricity package reported that “if we had characterized this as something to
do with greenhouse gases, it would have hurt the bill’s chances. So we didn’t.”60

The Critical Importance of Framing for GHG-Emission Reductions
Social-constructivist analysis rests on two basic tenets:61 that shared ideas rather
than material inºuences are the primary determinants of collective action and
that the interests of stakeholders primarily are shaped by learned values and
perceptions. Applying these two tenets to the challenge of GHG-emissions limitation/reduction points to the importance of local-level value and policy “framing.” Framing is intended to assign meaningful and potent interpretations of
conditions and events.62 For environmental as well as other contested issues,
framing “shapes the deªnitions of risk, the terms of participation, the range of
policy options considered, and the nature of political debate.”63 The core framing task of principal interest in this analysis is providing a powerfully resonating
“rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.”64 Because meaningful motivational frames “organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective,”65 they play a critical part in activating human behavior
that affects GHG emissions.
Subnational units of government are the governance structures closest to
individual and many institutional end-use consumers. Their elected and appointed ofªcials are positioned to perform community-sensitive and politically
accepted framing roles. Choice of a subnational government focus for this article does not diminish the role of other frame actors. Certainly, the climaticchange discourse involves “competing authority claims and a plurality of
voices”66—particularly those of nongovernmental actors.67
Any subnational government framing strategy aimed at changing individual and collective behavior must “understand what motivates people to act.”68
For most people, values derived from direct life experience are more deeply held
and predictive of consumptive behavior than are abstractly derived values.69 As
long as the creeping physical signals of global warming are not perceived
through direct personal experience, it will be difªcult to alter prevailing cultural
perspectives, risk assessments, and participation activity.70 However, there are
outcomes that accompany anthropogenic GHG emissions (for instance, air pollution) that are directly and quickly observable. Given that the currently perceived personal threat of global warming typically is spatially and temporally re60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Rabe 2002, 15, 26.
This discussion is adapted from Wendt 1999, 1, 7, 193.
Snow and Benford 1988, 198.
Miller 2006, 380.
Snow and Benford 1988, 199, 211.
Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986, 464.
Newell 2000, 167.
See Koehn 2006.
Bauer 2006a, 1.
Fazio and Zanna 1981, 195.
Jamieson 2006, 98.

Peter H. Koehn

• 63

mote and that, at present, few citizens or government bodies permanently
curtail consumption out of exclusive concern for its climatic impact,71 we also
need to explore the promise for subnational government action in the PRC and
the USA of issue bundling with directly experienced public concerns.

Emerging Subnational Frame-Extension Opportunities
As long as the associated community and personal threats and beneªts are perceived to be relatively small,72 we can expect that few citizens or subnational
governments in the United States and China will be willing to curtail practices
that exacerbate global warming out of exclusive concern for their climatic impact.73 When it comes to tackling the daunting challenge of controlling consumption, in particular, climatic-change framing must be extended to encompass and activate powerful additional motivators. For the foreseeable future,
therefore, the key to widespread emission-mitigating actions will be issue bundling in ways that link climatic stabilization to cherished place-based values74
and embed the local co-beneªts of lower-carbon pathways in sustainabledevelopment narratives.75 The bundling, or frame-extension, process must resonate in compelling ways with local grievances and desires.76 Three categories of
potential consumption and GHG-emission connections to perceived community, family, and personal concerns/beneªts are likely to activate local action:
environmental protection, health promotion, and economic security. In both
China and the United States, frame-extension opportunities in each value area
are “emerging” at the subnational government level in the sense that one encounters recent initiatives of considerable, but unfulªlled, potential.77
Local Environmental-Protection Co-Beneªts
One appealing co-beneªt of GHG-emission reductions is linkage with local environmental concerns. Recent developments indicate that sizeable segments of the
Mainland public are tiring of complacency and complicity on the part of
subnational authorities in the face of rural and urban environmental degradation. A growing number of China’s local governments have experienced
a groundswell of public protest against the dire economic and health conse71. Bord, Fisher, and O’Connor 1998, 78, 81, 83–84.
72. It is possible that the widely reported devastation wrought by hurricanes Katrina and Rita will
have a long-term impact on US perceptions of the direct personal threat of global warming. The
principal framing challenge in this connection is value and belief “ampliªcation” (see Snow,
Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986, 469–471).
73. Bord, Fisher, and O’Connor 1998, 81, 83–84.
74. See Bauer 2006b, 67–68.
75. Roberts and Parks 2006, 24.
76. Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986, 472, 477. Because framing strategies are variable
and complex, they demand political sensitivity and ingenuity on the part of local government
authorities. For instance, a particular set of grievances or desires might be emphasized for different target audiences. Rabe, Roman, and Dobelis 2005, 50.
77. See, for instance, Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, 486–490.
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quences of severe and unmitigated pollution. According to ofªcial sources,
China experienced 87,000 mass demonstrations or riots during 2005.78 Some of
the Mainland’s spontaneous public uprisings, including incidents in Dongyang,
Xinchang, Huaxi, and Dongzhou, centered on environmental and health degradations.79 Occasionally, village chiefs and local party ofªcials have supported
rural protests.80 Has spreading social unrest over pollution and environmental
degradation opened a new window for subnational framing of GHG-emission
mitigation in China?
At the same time that US overseas military deployments dramatically accelerate GHG emissions,81 their massive costs82 consume ªnancial resources that
might have addressed pressing domestic sustainable-transportation and GHGmitigation needs. Furthermore, during the Bush Administration’s term in ofªce,
the national Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not regulated carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydroºuorocarbons as air pollutants. Although the Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that the EPA possessed the authority
to regulate GHGs in a case ªled by Massachusetts and eleven other states,83 Bush
refused to instruct the Agency to take this action on the ground that “China will
produce greenhouse gases that will offset anything we do in a brief period of
time.”84 While the national government ignores the linkage possibilities, US
subnational governments are engaged in a number of innovative initiatives that
simultaneously mitigate GHG emissions and reduce local pollution. For instance, the states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire have expressly included
CO2 in their “multi-pollutant” clean-air strategies.85
Community environmental concerns are the focus of attention in the following co-beneªts discussion. First, we explore linkages between emissions mitigation and reduced environmental degradation (especially air pollution). This
analysis is followed by consideration of frame-extension strategies that involve
diminished resource consumption and depletion.
Reduced Environmental Degradation: One powerful framing strategy links GHGemission reductions to improvements in air quality. Lay publics are particularly
receptive to controlling emissions that negatively affect living and working
spaces. Betsill and Bulkeley discovered that existing concerns about air quality
frequently drew US local governments into the Cities for Climate Protection
(CCP) program.86 Moreover, Vasi found that many “innovation champions”
working for CCP member governments “explicitly associate activities against
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Willmott 2006, 15.
See Barnett 2003, 13.
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global climate change with measures for improving local air quality . . .”87 In
China, “the increasing availability of public information on pollution” and the
related rise in demands for action88 enhances the attractiveness of this frameextension option among local authorities.
By promoting renewable-energy projects, subnational governments are
able to link local interests and policy-making authority with respect to controlling air pollution to climatic-stabilization goals that only can be realized
through world-wide efforts.89 Promising alternatives to fossil-fuel combustion
in both China and the United States include the adoption of solar power, wind
power, geothermal power, and fuel cells.90 Large wind turbines and small household models ªgure prominently in the zero-emissions design for Dongtan. Increased reliance on renewable energy sources in the PRC simultaneously would
mitigate China’s severe urban air pollution problems and reduce the harmful effects of transPaciªc pollutants on the western United States.
Policies enacted by the Texas legislature in the late 1990s have resulted in
dramatic increases in reliance on wind power and an estimated annual reduction in CO2 emissions of 1.83 million tons.91 The New Jersey state government
relies on renewable sources for 15 percent of its electricity purchases.92 By mid
2006, 22 state governments had implemented Renewable Portfolio Standards
policies that mandate that renewable energy provide an increasing share of each
state’s electrical power, including 25 percent of New York’s electricity, by 2013.93
At the municipal level, the city of Colorado Springs adopted an energy program
requiring that 15 percent of the energy sold within its limits come from wind
sources by 2017.94
In light of its substantial and rapidly increasing contribution to domestic
and global CO2 emissions, “any serious GHG mitigation strategy must include
the [US] transportation sector.”95 Increasingly, states are encouraging mass transit and teleworking.96 The state of Washington and more than 70 local governments in nine of its counties have enacted measures that require large-scale employers to reduce employee commuting.97 Decreasing the need to travel also is a
central component in many of the targeted emissions-reduction programs
adopted by member governments in the Cities for Climate Protection program.98
The state of California, the largest automobile market in the USA, has ini87.
88.
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tiated the most far-reaching action to reduce transportation emissions. If its
ground-breaking initiative withstands auto-industry challenges in the courts
and with the EPA, California’s tough standards on tailpipe emissions of CO2
and other greenhouse gases will be adopted by northeastern and west-coast
states that account for 30 percent of all vehicles on US roads.99
In 1996, 8 out of every 1000 inhabitants owned a car in the China
Mainland—versus 769 per 1000 in the USA. Transportation accounted for only
8 percent of China’s total carbon emissions in 1998—versus 30 percent in the
USA.100 However, government data indicate that some 17 million private vehicles (13 per 1000 persons) navigated Mainland roads by 2005101 and analysts expect that “under a business-as-usual scenario, China’s transportation fuel consumption will reach current U.S. levels by 2030.”102
Substantial transportation-emission reductions are feasible in China via
issue bundling with local environmental concerns. Most of the world’s most
polluted cities are in China,103 and vehicle emissions have replaced coal soot as
the principal source of urban air pollution.104 In response, some urban local
governments in China are in the forefront worldwide in terms of active pursuit
of systems that incorporate fuel cells, electric drive, batteries, and hybrid combinations.105 These subnational pollution-control initiatives include fuel-cell
buses, cars, and motor scooters along with a hydrogen-infrastructure system106
and application of “intelligent transportation system” (ITS) technologies.107 The
Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou municipalities have implemented automotive-emission-control policies that are “stricter than central policies.”108 Successful implementation of municipal efforts to improve air quality in the transport
sector simultaneously curtails China’s GHG emissions.
Diminished Resource Consumption and Depletion: Energy-efªciency innovations
cannot be counted on to limit or reduce emissions levels by themselves because,
by lowering costs, enhanced efªciencies typically result in demand for additional materials and fossil-fuel-generated energy. Thus, attention also needs to
be devoted to unsustainable consumption levels in the USA and to the stress on
natural resources arising from China’s projected population of 1.6 billion—
including an additional 126 million increasingly afºuent households by
2015.109 Durable voluntary reductions in emissions-generating consumption
rarely occur in the absence of issue bundling. Collective and increasingly net99.
100.
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102.
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107.
108.
109.
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worked efforts that link reduced consumption to other motivators abound. One
powerful motivator among inhabitants of both countries is concern for the welfare of future generations.110
Concern for future generations demands that the “downstream” GHGemission consequences of production and consumption practices be taken into
account. The volume of waste that results from expanded production and consumption inevitably requires additional energy expenditures and generates increased GHG emissions at the disposal stage. For instance, massive exports of
discarded plastic and toxic e-waste from the United States to China require
Mainland governments at all levels to assume responsibility for disposal processes that exacerbate local pollution, GHG emissions, and long-term health
risks.111 The unregulated dumping of obsolete US computers and monitors containing toxic materials often overwhelms complicit Mainland local governments that already face daunting domestic waste-disposal challenges.112 In
2002, the Basel Action Network (BAN), the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, and
Green Peace China reported on the debilitating consequences of e-waste dumping in Guiyu.113 Since the US Government refuses to ratify the Basel Convention
and continues to envision exportation as a central part of the country’s e-waste
disposal strategy,114 subnational governments in China and the United States
need to engage one another directly regarding healthier ways to handle the generation and disposal of e-waste.115 Sustainable waste-management reductions in
downstream emissions also require durable changes in “upstream” consumption and mandatory take-back designs.
Health-Promotion Co-Beneªts
An important emission-mitigation framing strategy that is emerging at the
subnational level incorporates health and stress considerations. Many actions
that reduce GHG emissions over the long-term also immediately lower personal
stress and dramatically diminish direct and indirect threats to personal and
family health. Decreased exposure to the particulate matter that is associated
with the operation of coal-ªre plants and petrol-driven vehicles would avoid an
estimated 33,000 deaths per year in the USA by 2020, save far more lives in
China, and provide substantial public-health beneªts for inhabitants of both
countries.116 Since the negative health consequences associated with fossil-fuel
combustion processes are directly and quickly discernable, connecting GHG
110.
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112.
113.
114.
115.
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emissions, air pollution, and health offers subnational governments a potent
framing strategy.
The power of a framing strategy that links emissions mitigation with public health is illustrated by the case of Benxi, a mid-sized industrial city in
Liaoning Province.117 Subnational ofªcials, led by the director of the city’s Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), the mayor and deputy mayor, and
Liaoning Province’s EPB director, successfully transformed Benxi from the infamous city that could not be seen on satellite images due to the heavy smog that
engulfed it into a model city for source-point pollution control and prevention.
Studies showed that mortality from lung cancer had increased 2.3 times in
Benxi from 1971 to 1982 and continued to rise in industrial but not in less-polluted areas after 1986. City ofªcials persuasively “showcased” the link between
air pollution and lung cancer along with other respiratory diseases in extensive
public-education campaigns, a “green-schools” initiative, and funding appeals
to higher authorities and international donors.118
In the United States, the state of California’s leadership in capping allowable CO2 emissions has been framed, in part, as a local public-healthpromoting initiative that especially beneªts smog-afºicted communities.119 In
2006, the Democratic controlled legislature and Republican Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger reached an attention-generating agreement on a bill that imposes a 25 percent reduction in the state’s CO2 emissions by 2020.120
Transportation choices merit special attention in connection with bundling health, pollution control, and emission reductions. China’s vehicle emissions are associated with “brain damage, respiratory problems and infections,
lung cancer, [and] emphysema.”121 A joint UNDP-WHO study found air pollution responsible for an estimated 500,000 unnecessary deaths per year in 28
Mainland urban centers.122 China’s population also has experienced a dramatic
rise in obesity, diabetes, and abnormal blood lipid levels linked, in part, to recent declines in cycling and walking in favor of automobiles.123 Appeals to people’s health concerns constitute particularly promising avenues for reducing
vehicle emissions because they convincingly link visible air pollution to compelling personal motivations for diminished motor-vehicle use.
In order to address air-pollution concerns, prominent subnational governments in China have demonstrated serious interest in leapfrogging to buses, automobiles, and scooters that incorporate fuel cells, electric drive, compressed
natural gas, batteries, and biomass fuels.124 The Shanghai Municipality has pursued alternatives to car ownership and usage. In its model approach to GHG117. The following discussion of Benxi is based on Yu, et al. 2005.
118. UNDP partnered with the municipal government of Benxi on a project designed to strengthen
“municipal capacity for clean technology promotion.” Yu, et al. 2005, 42, 84.
119. Rabe, Roman, and Dobelis 2005, 9, 18.
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emissions reductions, Shanghai has explicitly integrated air quality and healthimpact considerations.125
In the United States, increases in child obesity can be attributed, in part, to
the precipitous decline in the percentage of the school-age population who ride
bicycles to school. At the local level, the provision of cyclist- and pedestrianfriendly routes and providing incentives for curtailing short car trips—particularly during peak trafªc hours—can bring about a substantial reduction in US
fossil-fuel emissions126 and keep obesity and type-2 diabetes in check.127 It is
noteworthy, therefore, that municipal policy makers in health-conscious communities such as Corvallis and Portland, Oregon, Palo Alto, California,
Missoula, Montana, and Boulder, Colorado, have taken the lead in promoting
and facilitating the development of bicycle-friendly communities.128
Economic Co-Beneªts
The third subnational frame-extension strategy that has emerged in China and
the United States links emissions limitation and reduction to economic cobeneªts. The bundled beneªts include economic-development, employment
opportunities, and cost savings.
China’s post-WTO-accession reforms empower local governments to authorize foreign investments in green technologies such as zero-emission wind
power. Green technology potentially constitutes “the most important industry
of the 21st century” and China is poised to be a leading green-technology
exporter within the next decade.129 Among the R&D possibilities are hydrogen
storage and refueling stations and zero-pollution zinc-air-battery-powered
bicycles.130 Local governments provide, or help secure, the requisite venture capital and technology-transfer training for a variety of small- and modest-scale urban and rural projects that mitigate GHG emissions and simultaneously are
employment-generating. Provincial governments, for instance, have subsidized
the local establishment of labor-intensive Suntech factories that manufacture
silicon photovoltaic cells.131 At subnational levels, China’s public entrepreneurs
already have successfully promoted efforts to produce, disseminate, and maintain small-scale wind turbines that supply cost-effective energy.132 Further development of China’s localized wind industry promises to result in considerable
employment generation.133
Increasingly, political leaders at the state and city level in the USA perceive
125. Chiu, Green, and Sibold 2003, 42–44, 47; and Koehn 2004, 388.
126. See Andrews 2006.
127. Brody 2006. An estimated 97 million US Americans, nearly one-third of the total population,
are obese. Darlin 2006, B6.
128. Devlin 2003.
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and promote GHG-emissions-mitigation strategies as supportive of long-term
economic interests. Across the US west, for instance, new coalitions of conservation, agricultural, tourist-industry, and even utility interests are supporting renewable-energy and GHG-reduction initiatives.134 Other subnational proponents of climate change mitigation emphasize the cost-savings that accompany
innovative energy-efªcient operations along with the economic-development
opportunities associated with renewable-energy ventures.135 Ofªcials in California, for instance, have “consistently linked concern about climate protection
with economic development opportunities.”136 Policy makers in Texas have successfully cultivated support for wind farms by emphasizing “entrepreneurial opportunities for renewable energy developers. . . .”137 Most US local governments
constantly are under pressure to cut costs. Vasi found that linking emission reductions to “saving money” has been a particularly effective framing strategy
among Cities for Climate Protection members.138
Recent extreme weather events in both China and the United States are
likely to have encouraged additional local government leaders to consider framing climatic-stabilization measures in cost-savings terms. More than half of the
US population lives in areas adjacent to or near a coast139 that are increasingly
vulnerable to rising sea levels and storm-induced ºooding. Hurricane Katrina
and its aftermath obliterated the tax base for municipal governments in southern Louisiana at the same time that the damage it inºicted imposed catastrophic
social and economic costs. Faced with unprecedented ªnancial burdens, ofªcials in New Orleans and other Gulf Coast municipalities had no choice but to
institute massive employee layoffs and service reductions.140 In August 2006,
super-typhoon Saomai, the strongest to hit China in 50 years, devastated homes
and infrastructure in the southeastern province of Zhejiang.141 The impact of
both storms has increased public awareness that adaptation to climatic change
will be a costly proposition. As Stephen Schneider has pointed out, GHGemission reductions are cost-effective in the long run.142

Conclusion
Climate change politics have moved beyond scientiªc studies, international
agreements, and national government actors. In the absence of national politi134. Brownstein 2007, A8; also see Zezima 2007. In an April 2007 New York Times/CBS News poll,
75 percent of the US public expressed willingness to “pay more for electricity if it were generated by renewable energy sources like solar or wind” in order to reduce global warming.
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cal will and the commitment of adequate ªnancial resources at the center, the
local and transnational initiatives of subnational governments and nonstate actors operating “underneath Kyoto” have been inspiring and will continue to
have an important mitigating impact for the foreseeable future. In a development that illustrates the multilayered and transnationally connected nature of
contemporary global governance, four US city governments and two environmental NGOs have secured standing to sue two national government agencies
(the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank) in
an effort to halt US-supplied loans and insurance coverage for overseas power
plants that emit greenhouse gases. The city government/NGO coalition argued
that such overseas projects are subject to National Environmental Policy Act regulations since they contribute to degradation of the US environment.143
At regional, state/provincial, and local levels in both China and the United
States, there is growing appreciation for the power of framing proactive
subnational efforts to address global warming in connection with local cobeneªts that extend “beyond climate.”144 In a political context characterized by
governmental fragmentation, and inaction by those currently in power at the
center of the nation-state, increasingly independent subnational governments
are emboldened to participate in emissions-limitation and emissions-reduction
activity through cooperation with NGOs, business ªrms, and transnational
actors that focus on air-quality, health-promotion, cost-savings, economicdevelopment and employment, and renewable-energy opportunities.145 Working in concert with transnationally competent overseas Chinese is likely to be
especially fruitful for China’s local governments.146
For the most part, China’s cities and provinces have not yet adopted policy
strategies that address GHG emissions directly.147 Nevertheless, the subnational
government initiatives that are starting to affect GHG emissions in China and in
every region of the United States carry widespread public appeal because the cobeneªts of mitigation are highly valued at the grass-roots level. In an impressive
group of US states and cities, and increasingly at the local level in China, public
concerns about air pollution, consumption and waste management, trafªc congestion, health threats, the ability to attract tourists, and/or diminishing resources are legitimizing policy developments that carry the co-beneªt of controlling GHG emissions. Collectively, expanding and emerging subnational
government efforts to promote renewable energy, reduce urban air pollution,
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For Mayor’s Rocky Anderson’s framing of Salt Lake City’s successful efforts to “combat global
warming” in these terms, see Anderson 2006.
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and embrace emission-reduction targets “constitute a diverse set of policy innovations rich with lessons” for climatic stabilization.148
In an environment of multilayered politics, the strengths of decentralized
governmental systems include enhanced competition, innovation, experimentation, and adaptation to local conditions.149 Thus, it is not surprising that local
policy framing enables subnational levels of government to become “more capable and innovative than their central-level counterparts”150 in the climaticchange arena. Eventually, local emission-mitigation initiatives will need to be
enhanced by increasingly proactive national governments. Although climate
protection cannot be addressed entirely at the subnational level, in China and
the United States today the principal issue-bundling impetus for emissionsmitigation-policy and consumptive-behavior change is bubbling and spreading
from the bottom up.
Maximizing the capacity of subnational governments to deal with the
daunting climatic-change challenges raised by population and consumption
trajectories in both countries requires that additional US states and cities, and
Mainland provinces, municipalities, and townships adopt politically palatable
framing strategies. In order to take full advantage of arising opportunities to
inºuence individual and collective behavior, local authorities must be trusted
and transparent and their framings must be “credible and persuasive.”151 A cobeneªts framing strategy that links individual and speciªc community concerns
for morbidity, mortality, stress reduction, and healthy human development for
all with GHG-emission limitation/reduction and renewable-energy development is especially likely to resonate powerfully and non-competitively at the
subnational level throughout China and the United States.152
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